Clearing the Air

How the Smoking Ban Was Won

by Peter Ruddell and Emily Gerkin Palsrok
March 16, 2010

Chapters 1 & 2 | Chapters 3 & 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapters 6, 7 & 8

Chapter 1: The Campaign for Smokefree Air

April 2005
With less than 24 hours to go before launching the largest and most organized effort to eliminate smoking in Michigan workplaces, our campaign couldn’t have been in much worse shape. The past couple of weeks had been rocky, nearly ruining an otherwise sunny April. Normally, we’d all have been happy that spring appeared to be coming early. But our newly formed coalition, the Campaign for Smokefree Air, was struggling to get off the ground — and hostile opposition groups were keeping us firmly planted. We were even struggling to find enough lawmakers to support our initial legislation. The daunting task of clearing the smoke from Michigan’s air wasn’t starting out well.

Yet here we were, trying to organize a small group of passionate advocates into what we needed to be viewed as an organized, powerful and successful launch for our campaign and legislative initiative. The core of our group and various legislative staffers were gathered in a lobbying firm’s conference room a few blocks from the state Capitol trying to hash out the details and messaging of the kick-off, planned for April 19 on the steps of the state Capitol. The energy and passion of the previous months spent putting together our campaign were hitting their first major wall — how to craft a message so that the Republican-controlled legislature would not immediately put the issue off as anti-business.

We weren’t breaking new ground nationally with our comprehensive ban, but the odds against us were long. Only eight states had enacted comprehensive smokefree laws by early 2005 — California (1995), Delaware (2002), Connecticut (2003), Florida (2003), New York (2003), Idaho (2004), Maine (2004) and Massachusetts (2004). And in Michigan, only one lawmaker had consistently been focused on smokefree air — Sen. Ray Basham, a Democrat from Taylor in downriver Detroit.

It was the success in that handful of states that provided the motivation to establish a new coalition in Michigan — the Campaign for Smokefree Air — led by the nation’s leading voluntary health organizations: the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association and American Lung Association. And organizing the Campaign came on the heels of another important tobacco victory. In 2004 these same groups had been successful in their “Hike it for Health!” campaign, which raised Michigan’s tobacco tax (or as we preferred to call it, tobacco “user fee” — because it’s not a tax if you can choose not to pay it) for the second time in three years. Michigan was, in fact, leading the nation in one of the three main ways to prevent tobacco use — economic disincentives. The health organizations decided it was time to start focusing on one of the other public policy methods to reduce tobacco use — mandatory smokefree environments.

The campaign hired John Bailey & Associates, a Troy-based firm with an office in downtown Lansing, for the media relations and communications component and Wiener Associates, a medium-size, multi-client lobbying firm specializing in health issues, for the lobbying and legal support. The three health organizations had been working with Wiener Associates for nearly 20 years. The Coalition also leaned heavily on the support of the Michigan Health and Hospital Association, representing all 143 community hospitals in Michigan, and Michigan State Medical Society, which boasts a membership of 15,000 physicians.

Lined up against the Campaign was a larger and far-better funded group that included “Big Tobacco” and the Michigan Restaurant Association, Michigan Licensed Beverage Association, Michigan Distributors and Vendors and three of Lansing’s largest and most powerful multi-client lobbying firms, Government Consulting Services, Inc., Muchmore Harrington Smalley and Associates, and Public Affairs Associates. (A fourth, Karoub Associates, would come in later.) Also in the mix were multi-clients Cusmano Kandler and Reed, and LGI Consulting. Leading the media relations efforts was The Rossman Group.

The absence of additional lobbying firms on the Campaign’s side ran counter to recent trends and was a good indication of the uphill battle ahead. Recent practice in Lansing has been for each side on a major issue to hire as many firms as possible, both to increase firepower and keep important players from advocating for the other side. Quite simply, a lack of financial resources kept the Campaign from using that tactic. It felt more than a little like David vs. Goliath.

Nevertheless, the government and public temperament against tobacco, given the tobacco tax increase and the tobacco settlement lawsuit of the late 1990s, had given the health care organizations new air in their sails. While we could never compete with the big money of tobacco groups, the health groups seemed to finally have won the public’s support for their issues and wanted to keep the momentum going.

Search for sponsors
It was the third year of the Granholm administration and the legislature was controlled by Republicans. Sen. Basham was a possible bill sponsor because of his outspokenness on the issue. But working against him was his status as a first-term senator in the Democratic minority with only two public acts to his name in his first two years in the Senate. The prospects of Senate Republicans approving a Basham bill were slim.

And many of our most enthused advocates were not pleased with Sen. Basham’s Senate Bill 186 of 2003. The legislation had provided numerous exemptions in its proposal to make restaurants smokefree — including bowling alleys and private clubs. Despite the fact that Sen. Basham had earned an early reputation as a champion of this issue, some advocates pushed for a different sponsor. Coalition members were searching for the “perfect” sponsor — someone who would introduce only our “perfect” version of the bill and advocate only for it with no changes. Key coalition members’ passion and commitment to a no-compromise approach were at odds with legislative reality and would, if it continued, provide a tough internal challenge for the Campaign. A serious divide between those who were willing to move a feasible bill and those who would only accept a full ban would weaken and possibly doom the already difficult effort.

One major omission in Sen. Basham’s earlier bill was the creation of smokefree workplaces — not just smokefree restaurants. So the Campaign made a tactical decision to create two bills — one requiring smokefree workplaces and one requiring smokefree bars and restaurants. This decision allowed us to continue working with Sen. Basham and his passion for the issue while developing a bipartisan legislative and public relations campaign by adding another bill. It also created an opportunity for the only doctor in the Senate at the time, Sen. Tom George, a Kalamazoo Republican, to become involved as well.

Interestingly, Sen. Basham’s bill drew three cosponsors. George’s more comprehensive measure attracted only two co-sponsors. One was Sen. Basham. The other was Rochester Republican Mike Bishop — and the irony of that would become clear later.

Senators from both parties had been secured by late February to sponsor a Senate bill, allowing the Campaign to turn its attention to the House to find the same dynamic. The House was just as important, not only for the final outcome but for the launch as well, because we needed the opportunity to start efforts in either chamber. Both chambers were ruled by the GOP, and we weren’t getting a warm feeling from either Senate Majority Leader Ken Sikkema of Grandville or House Speaker Craig DeRoche of Novi. 

We did not have a natural champion in the House, so we needed to find one quickly. Our first choice was Rep. Barb Vander Veen, a Republican from Allendale, who quickly took on the issue. Her history as a nurse and working in the health care field made her a natural ally, much like Sen. George. Our second House sponsor needed to be a first-term Democratic lawmaker, for several reasons. Under term limits, with its “three House terms and you’re out” rule, lawmakers tended to work more with the members of the class they came in with. That meant we wanted a freshman lawmaker in order to carry the message to that group. And in the event our efforts took longer than one two-year legislative session to bear fruit, we also would need some continuity from one term to the next.

With the Democrats in the minority, we looked first for a representative from a “safe seat,” so as not to cause the name on the bill to throw up another impediment to the legislation receiving a fair hearing. We approached Rep. Lee Gonzales of Flint, who was prepared to sponsor the workplace smokefree bill. But he soon decided the bill was too broad and might have included restaurants. He was not willing, at least at this point in his career, to require restaurants to be smokefree.

As days of sponsor-searching turned to weeks, we shifted quickly into crisis mode. Our press conference with four bill sponsors was one day away, and yet we had only three. We scrambled to find a fourth bill sponsor and looked almost exclusively at representatives with a health care background, believing they were our best, if not only, hope. While our side was feeling some momentum overall, most lawmakers still did not want to touch our issue. Going after Big Tobacco, with its bottomless war chest, and taking on political powerhouses like the Michigan Restaurant Association and the Michigan Licensed Beverage Association were not easy asks.

After much review, two names finally jumped off our list — Reps. Leslie Mortimer and Brenda Clack. Mortimer agreed instantly. We were surprised. Rep. Mortimer, from Horton, was a Republican in a hotly contested district who had barely won her election. Would it be possible that we had turned an issue that was viewed as liberal into one with Republicans as three of the four bill sponsors? While we appreciated Mortimer’s enthusiasm, Rep. Vander Veen was adamant there be a Democratic sponsor and was just as adamant that Rep Clack of Flint be that sponsor. She did become the fourth, without any time to spare.

At the news conference we announced the formation of the Campaign for Smokefree Air and our goal of making all Michigan workplaces smokefree. Upwards of 400 supporters rallied at the front of the Capitol as we officially introduced Lansing to the Campaign and the players who would not give up. Of the four sponsors, Sen. Basham easily dominated the conversation with his history on the issue.

Ironically, a woman who wandered into our news conference purposely sat on the Capitol steps and smoked a cigarette. She knew what our rally and news conference were attempting to communicate and she felt it was her right to smoke wherever she wanted. Her stubborn, in-your-face attitude was symbolic of those who would oppose our efforts for the duration.

Chapter 2: Building the Coalition

Key players
From the onset, the campaign was run by a steering committee made up of representatives of our core members, plus Peter Ruddell from Wiener and Emily Gerkin Palsrok from John Bailey. The two lynchpin members of the steering committee, which made final decisions on all strategy, both legislative and communications, were Judy Stewart from the American Cancer Society and Katherine Knoll from the American Heart Association.

Stewart and Knoll had known each other for years and had worked on many projects together. They complemented each other. Katherine quickly became the person to engage in shuttle diplomacy, while Judy served as the main media contact because of her proven ability to stay “on message” and help keep others on message as well. Both were beacons of tenacity throughout the campaign, moving mountains to make legislative meetings at the last minute and accommodating all media requests, no matter how random. Their energy and commitment never wavered for a moment. The third leg of their tripod was from the American Lung Association — first Carol Christner and later Susan Schechter.

The steering committee met every other Monday, faithfully, in the lower-level conference room of Wiener Associates. Each meeting followed an agenda focused on strategy and updates — legislative, communications and advocacy. As other players entered the Campaign during its course, they too fell into this structure. The first group of individuals who met regularly also included Karen Holcomb Merrill of Tobacco Free Michigan, Colin Ford of the Michigan State Medical Society and Chris Mitchell of the Michigan Health and Hospital Association. We were fortunate to have the support of the health insurers, too, including Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan.

The legislative leadership, Majority Leader Sikkema and Speaker DeRoche, made one thing plainly clear: under their watch there would be no action on a smokefree bill. Right out of the gate, we had an instant tall hurdle. The legislature’s leaders wouldn’t take it up, and the governor was not interested in making noise for us despite being a supporter of the issue.

Leadership’s reaction bolstered the advocates within the Campaign who wanted to forgo the legislative route and take it straight to the voters via a ballot initiative. The Campaign’s leaders, however, wanted to make a hard legislative push — something they had never done. Despite the long odds, it was decided early in 2005 to stay focused on a legislative campaign. Knowing it was uphill, we needed to get creative in our messaging and tactics. Adding to our challenge was the political reality of the deep pockets of our opponents. Big Tobacco would spend more than $700,000 in the 2005-06 legislative cycle to effectively push its influence on the GOP to prevent a vote on our issue.

At the same time we were launching the Campaign in April 2005, we also were in the field with our first statewide poll of Michigan voters. While we had seen the polls from other states, this poll conducted by John Bailey & Associates gave us our own local numbers to use with lawmakers. We discussed oversampling in certain legislative districts in order to provide lawmakers with even greater local details, but costs prohibited us from utilizing that tactic.

We weren’t surprised when we saw the results. Of the 600 registered Michigan voters we polled regarding air quality in the workplace, dining establishments and other entertainment venues, nearly two thirds “strongly favored” or “somewhat favored” a law creating smokefree environments in all places. Further, 80 percent felt that it was important to work in a smokefree environment. We were also happy to see that 90 percent of respondents thought that secondhand smoke was harmful to their health. Now we just needed to convince lawmakers of the same.

In addition to our poll, we were gathering every scientific study on the issue we could get our hands on — studies on the effects of secondhand smoke on our health and on the economy. It’s one of the most documented and studied issues of the last 15 years, so we were literally tripping over great data.

It was also at this point we recognized that despite the overwhelming volume of scientific, unbiased evidence on our side, the facts didn’t seem to matter to a large number of the people who pushed the red and green voting buttons.

During this period we made two analogies to other legislation to help legislators come over to our side. First, we compared secondhand smoke to alcohol and driving. Alcohol and tobacco are both legal products, yet the State of Michigan regulates who can drink, where they can drink and how much they can drink before the consumption of alcohol becomes dangerous to the general public. Elected officials trip over the red ribbons to gain attention and respect from Mothers Against Drunk Driving, yet secondhand smoke kills at least five times as many people in Michigan as drunk driving. The second major analogy we used was primary enforcement of seat belts. Here is an issue where the State of Michigan is mandating a behavior on an individual when he or she is the only person in harm’s way.

Unfortunately, both analogies and our early legislative strategy failed by themselves to produce a groundswell of support in the legislature.

Grassroots strategy
For the first two years of the Campaign’s existence, we devoted more time to building the number of coalition partners than to many other areas. The coalition began with only seven organizations — the three voluntary health organizations plus the hospital association, medical society, Tobacco Free Michigan and the Michigan Osteopathic Association. We knew that if we were going to be successful in the legislature we would need a truly grassroots effort. And to mount a grassroots effort that could make a difference in the face of being outgunned politically, we needed as many partners as we could gather.

The name of the coalition itself had been one of the first issues that was hotly debated. The coalition’s public relations team argued successfully that the name should imply a movement or an action, not merely another coalition of do-gooders. The team believed that would attract more advocates to the cause and provide the public with a better sense of our mission.

The Campaign created a website, managed for the duration by Jason Harder of the heart association, www.MakeMiAirSmokefree.org. The website was used to store information, provide the news media with background and in-depth studies, provide a map that tracked national progress of smokefree states, and sign up advocates. We used the database created through the website for our advocacy efforts.

From time to time, we also had those who disagreed with our position contact us through our website to voice their opposition. While the majority were pretty harmless, some folks took a nasty tone and used the opportunity to vent. One gentleman went so far as to make physical threats to us (including a reference to an automatic weapon), and the local police department was called to investigate.

Like most other organization’s beginnings, we conducted significant baseline polling. Even the voluntary health organizations were shocked at the popularity in their respective names — particularly when compared to Lansing heavyweights. The Campaign, wanting to diversify its membership and fend off criticism that the measure was hostile to business, also looked far and wide for any business group to join. We developed an extensive strategy aimed at the Detroit Regional Chamber in particular. Because the Chamber’s board, at that time, was dominated by health organizations, we felt there was a potential hole in the business group’s armor.

We never did get the Chamber to join. But we did land the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG). This was a direct result of the personal relationship and admiration the leaders of AIAG had with Dr. Ron Davis, an East Lansing physician in league with the Campaign. Dr. Davis had a distinguished career at the national Centers for Disease Control as well as the Michigan Department of Public Health during the Engler administration, and he currently ran the Center for Health Promotion and Disease Prevention at Henry Ford Health System in Detroit. He had become an internationally renowned tobacco expert, and during the time smokefree air was being debated in the legislature, Dr. Davis became president of the American Medical Association. Dr. Davis’s steadfast dedication to making Michigan smokefree and his national position of prominence brought a host of other coalition partners.

Once again proving that Lansing is a small town, lobbyists for the restaurant association happened to attend the same church as the Campaign’s principal lobbyist. One Sunday after reading the story of “Doubting Thomas” to the congregation, Father Mark Inglot related it to many modern day secondhand issues — including secondhand smoke. Fr. Mark went into great detail about the dangers contained in the smoke we cannot see, and how the most popular bar in East Lansing had gone smokefree on its own. Unfortunately, only the lobbyists for the restaurant association had attended that mass, not the Campaign lobbyist. First thing the following Monday, the Campaign’s lobbyist received a series of e-mails accusing him of using the Catholic Church as a vessel to further his crusade against secondhand smoke.

The thought of approaching faith-based organizations had never occurred to us, but thanks to these new, false accusations we pursued faith-based organizations with great vigor.

We immediately scheduled a meeting with Sister Monica Kostielney, president and CEO, and Paul Long, vice president of public policy, of the Michigan Catholic Conference to discuss the issue. We prepped for the meeting by doing research on Catholic theology on tobacco specifically and disease prevention generally. Only Knoll (a protestant) of the American Heart Association was able to join the Campaign’s lobbyist at the meeting. Knoll was both in awe and intimidated by Sr. Monica’s quiet, yet forceful demeanor. She was hardly the first to come under the spell of Sr. Monica. Being threatened by tobacco thugs was less intimidating to her than meeting with this legendary, political-activist nun.

Not only did the Michigan Catholic Conference join the coalition, but so did the Michigan Jewish Conference and a host of other faith-based organizations. While faith-based groups may have seemed at the time like a modest addition to the Campaign, they were a huge help in our struggle to find coalition partners that were not primarily health organizations. As the issue evolved, the full support of Sr. Monica, Long and their organization also took off the table one important exemption — bingo. It halted any traction by Michigan Democratic Party Chair Mark Brewer, who tried to get Democrats to exempt bingo — a big moneymaker for the party — at every turn in the campaign.

Coffee anyone? Our most successful grassroots tactic throughout the campaign became legislator coffee hours. We developed a sophisticated plan and strategy to have local advocates meet with their lawmaker in the legislator’s district. While we started using this tactic in the early days, we grew more sophisticated in our organization throughout the years and really worked this issue locally better than other grassroots organizations.

Chapters 1 & 2 | Chapters 3 & 4 | Chapters 5 | Chapters 6, 7, & 8